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Abstract This paper explains the observed combination of relatively low levels of democ-
racy and positive attitudes towards it in the Muslim world. It argues that this democracy
paradox is understandable from the perspective of the principle of diminishing marginal
utility: people value highly that of which they have little. This reasoning implies, however,
that surveys like the World Values Surveys (WVS) elicit circumstance-driven marginal pref-
erences rather than culturally determined attitudinal traits. Empirical evidence showing that
individuals living in undemocratic societies have much more favorable inclinations towards
democracy supports our argument.
Keywords Culture · Attitudes · Marginal preferences · Measurement · Outcomes
1 Introduction
In a recent illuminative paper in this journal, Rowley and Smith (2009) draw attention to
what they call Islam’s democracy paradox: the fact that Muslim-majority countries tend
to be less democratic, while both individual Muslims and individuals in Muslim-majority
countries value democracy more than other people do. Such a paradox has been observed
by other authors as well (e.g., Bratton 2003; Hoffman 2004; Inglehart and Norris 2003;
Jamal and Tessler 2008; Mogahed 2006; Rose 2002). To these authors, this gap between
democratic attitudes and institutions in the Islamic world is puzzling. It has to be explained
by other factors; gender equality (Inglehart and Norris 2003) and religious freedom (Rowley
and Smith 2009) are suggested candidates.
This paper argues that looking for omitted variables to explain Islam’s democracy puzzle
is misguided. In fact, it claims there is no puzzle. We show, first of all, that the negative re-
lation between democratic attitudes and actual levels of democracy is not unique to Muslim
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countries. Secondly, we find that this paradoxical negative relation between attitudes and
practices is of the same nature as other observed paradoxes in research of attitudinal traits,
such as the finding by Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) and Weil (2009) that those who
value work the least tend to be most productive in terms of income (see also McCleary and
Barro 2006). We argue that it can be understood in terms of the basic economic principle
of diminishing marginal utility. If something is scarce, we value it more. Muslim-majority
countries tend to be less democratic, so its inhabitants have a craving for more democracy.
There is nothing paradoxical about this—it is basic microeconomics.
This argument fits an emerging trend in cross-cultural research criticizing values surveys
measures for mistaking marginal preferences (the preference for increasing satiation of an
objective given current levels of satiation) for attitudes (the preference for satiating the ob-
jective in general) (Maseland and van Hoorn 2009, 2010; Phelps 2006: 14–15 also raises
this point). Whereas differences in attitudes may explain differences in outcomes such as
levels of democracy, marginal preferences are driven by rather than drivers of differences
in environments. Such arguments resonate with a broader literature that has come up in re-
cent years propagating rational choice rather than cultural or theological explanations for the
behavior of religious groups (e.g., Epstein and Gang 2007; Iannaccone and Berman 2006;
Kurrild-Klitgaard et al. 2006). In the spirit of this literature, our argument indicates that
instead of uncritically ascribing observed behavioral and ideational differences between
groups to cultural or religious beliefs, they can be better understood in terms of rational
responses to different circumstances. The so-called marginal preferences problem of values
surveys implies that attitudinal indicators based on questionnaire items do not reflect cul-
tural or religious differences, but simply diminishing marginal utility. Islam’s democracy
paradox serves to highlight this point.
The structure of this paper is as follows. In Sect. 2 we briefly consider the economics
literature on religion and discuss the determinants of democracy and democratic attitudes,
specifically the consistent observation of a Muslim democracy paradox. Section 3 provides
a theoretical explanation for this paradox in terms of marginal preferences, culminating in
hypotheses by which to test the validity of the marginal preferences argument. Section 4
presents our empirical analysis, showing that there is a consistent negative relation between
democratic institutions and democratic attitudes as measured by questionnaire items from
the World Values Survey (WVS). These results strongly support the marginal preferences
argument. In Sect. 5, we conclude that the Muslim democracy paradox is part of this general
negative relation between levels of democracy and measures of attitudes, and is attributable
to the fact that the measures used elicit marginal preferences rather than attitudes.
2 Islam and democracy: a supposed paradox
2.1 Religion in economics
Interest among economists in religion and religious behavior has increased in recent years.
Two main approaches can be distinguished. First, starting with Iannaccone’s seminal contri-
butions (1988, 1992a, 1992b), an expanding literature has developed that applies economic
insights to religious behavior. The objective of this body of research is to explain religious
behavior with the common tools of rational choice analysis. Some examples of this approach
are the studies by Epstein and Gang (2007), Iannaccone and Berman (2006), and Kurrild-
Klitgaard et al. (2006), all of which explain the occurrence of religious fundamentalism and
terrorism in terms of a rational choice framework. This work shows that lack of freedom
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(Kurrild-Klitgaard et al. 2006), lack of effectively functioning states and markets (Iannac-
cone and Berman 2006), and the presence of competition between religious groups (Epstein
and Gang 2007) are all conducive to religious extremism and militancy.
A second class of literature focuses on the consequences of religious beliefs and ide-
ology for political and economic outcomes. In contrast to the rational choice approach to
religion, this literature takes religious beliefs and ideology as exogenous inputs to political
and economic behavior rather than seeing them as products of rational decision making.
This approach has been given a lift by Huntington’s famous clash of civilizations thesis
(Huntington 1993, 1996), which boosted interest in the political-economic effects of reli-
gious values. Some research in this area is based on historical case studies (Kuran 2003,
2009), though most makes use of quantitative analyses relating political and economic
outcomes to religious and cultural beliefs and values (e.g., Barro and McCleary 2003;
McCleary and Barro 2006). As an early example of this trend, Glahe and Vorhies (1989)
show that Judeo-Christian liberal values are conducive to economic development. As part of
this literature, several studies have focused on the impact of the Islamic faith on democracy
(Karatnycky 2002; Midlarsky 1998; Rowley and Smith 2009; see also Inglehart et al. 2002).
This research has produced some supposedly paradoxical results.
2.2 The democracy paradox of Islam
The democracy paradox of Islam, according to Rowley and Smith (2009), is the fact that
Muslim-majority countries tend to be significantly less democratic than other societies, al-
though their citizens and, in fact, individual Muslims everywhere appear to entertain a more
positive attitude towards democracy than others do.
The first part of this paradox is readily accepted. The determinants of democracy have
been well researched, a primary driver being economic prosperity (Lipset 1959). Part of
this relation between economic prosperity and the level of democracy runs through its
effects on education and the size of the middle class (Shafiq 2009; Glaeser et al. 2007;
Evans and Rose 2007; Hadenius 1992; Kamens 1988; Lipset 1959). However, with mea-
sures of education and middle class controlled for, income continues to have an indepen-
dent effect as well (Barro 1999). Natural circumstances such as country size and insular-
ity are further found to affect the prevalence of democracy (Anckar 2002; Barro 1999;
Clague et al. 2001; Hadenius 1992), although the theoretical mechanism behind these re-
lationships is rather obscure. In addition, income inequality, the urbanization rate, and
ethnic heterogeneity have been argued to influence democracy. Statistically observable
effects of these factors are rather weak, however (Barro 1999). On top of such gen-
eral determinants of democracy, researchers have called attention to historical particulari-
ties such as colonial legacy (Anckar 2002; Clague et al. 2001; Huntington 1984; Weiner
1987), religious background, and cultural traditions (Clague et al. 2001; Huntington 1993;
Inglehart 1988). In particular, Islam consistently shows up as a significant, negative fac-
tor in many empirical studies (Barro 1999; Fish 2002; Karatnycky 2002; Midlarsky 1998;
Rowley and Smith 2009; Ross 2001). Several explanations have been proposed to ex-
plain this empirical regularity. These range from the absence of separation of church
and state in Islam (Huntington 1993, 1996; see also Minkenberg 2007), through gender
inequality (Fish 2002; Inglehart and Norris 2003), to endowments of oil (Barro 1999;
Ross 2001). As it turns out, material conditions such as the availability of oil and the as-
sociated inequality explain something, but do not take away the significantly negative re-
lation between a Muslim background and democratic institutions (Barro 1999; Fish 2002;
Rowley and Smith 2009). The answer thus seems to lie in beliefs and attitudes associated
with Islam itself.
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Yet, by now, a vast literature has emerged showing that Muslims tend to lack de-
mocratic institutions but not democratic inclinations (e.g., Bratton 2003; Hoffman 2004;
Inglehart and Norris 2003; Jamal and Tessler 2008; Mogahed 2006; Rose 2002; Rowley and
Smith 2009). Rather to the contrary, analysis of data from the World Values Survey (WVS)
reveals that both individual Muslims and Muslim-majority countries have a relatively favor-
able perception of democracy (Rowley and Smith 2009). To show this, we repeat Rowley
and Smith’s (2009: 290–292) individual-level analysis of the association between Islam and
democratic attitudes at the country level. Data on attitudes towards democracy also come
from the WVS (European Values Study Group & World Values Survey Association 2006)
and Table 1 depicts the results for the five items on democracy included in the WVS.1
It appears that democracy has universal appeal with the percentages of people viewing
democracy as something very good or fairly good being high both among Muslim and non-
Muslim societies—the third item asking people whether they feel democracy is indecisive
and has too much squabbling is an exception. The difference between Muslim countries and
the rest of the world does not lie so much in the share of democratically inclined people
but in how positive towards democracy people are. Whereas almost everyone seems to view
democracy favorably to some extent, Table 1 clearly shows that people from Muslim coun-
tries are more prone to be very rather than fairly positive about democracy. The most com-
prehensive evidence comes from comparing the mean scores on the five democracy items.
In most cases—the fourth item is an exception—the average attitude towards democracy
is statistically significantly more positive in Muslim countries than it is in other countries
(p < 0.10 or better). It are these latter two findings that makes the relation between Islam
and democracy appear paradoxical; “Muslims claim to like democracy, so why do they have
so little?” (Rowley and Smith 2009: 273).2
Since they are tapping political attitudes in states where people may feel they are being
endangered by expressing political opinions, we obviously need to take results of the polls
in question with a healthy dose of caution (Kuran 1995; cf. Rowley and Smith 2009: 274).
However, although a repressive environment may lead to preference falsification and thus
cast doubt on the validity of surveys, it is not clear that this should have a systematic effect
and thereby translate into a significantly more positive evaluation of democracy. In some
cases—particularly where the authoritarian regime makes a point of cultivating a demo-
cratic façade—it might. It is just as likely, however, that repression causes people to under-
state their commitment to democracy. What is more, Rowley and Smith (2009) show that the
positive relation between democratic attitudes and Islam exists not only at the country level
but also at the level of individual Muslims. For these reasons, biases due to repressive envi-
ronments likely do not cause the positive relation between Muslim identity and democratic
attitudes. We need a different explanation.
1Rowley and Smith’s (2009: 290–292) individual-level evidence based on the same items concerning indi-
viduals’ attitude towards democracy can be found in their Tables 7 to 11. Their Table 12 (Rowley and Smith
2009: 293) gives some aggregate-level evidence of the positive relation between Islam and attitudes towards
democracy. We discuss the five democracy items and our data in more detail in Sect. 4.
2This alleged paradox is robust to changes in the criterion that identifies countries as Muslim. Results are
qualitatively unaffected when we replace Rowley and Smith’s (2009: 285, 287) country classification with
classifications based on Islam as the largest religion, Islam as religion of over 90% of the population, the
percentage of Arabs, or predominantly Sunni Muslim populations (data from the CIA World Factbook; results
available on request).
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Fig. 1 Choice between
Materialist and Postmaterialist
objectives
3 Explaining away the paradox: cultural attitudes and marginal preferences
3.1 Values versus marginal preferences
Islam’s democracy paradox fits in a longer list of paradoxes reported by researchers linking
attitudes to outcomes. Measures of attitudes and values produced by survey instruments are
found to fluctuate heavily with changing circumstances rather than appearing to be stable
indicators of deep-rooted inclinations (Clarke et al. 1999; Duch and Taylor 1993). What is
more, they correlate negatively with outcomes in many different areas. Bertrand and Mul-
lainathan (2001), for example, find that individuals who value leisure more highly, work to
earn larger incomes on average. Weil (2009) similarly reports that per-capita income levels
are lower in societies attaching more importance to work relative to leisure. In an effort to
investigate the relation between the value attached to objectives and outcomes more system-
atically, House et al. (2004) conducted a vast research project covering 62 societies. To their
surprise, they find strong evidence that the value attached to objectives and the degree to
which these objectives are satiated in a society are negatively correlated. Finally, throughout
his work, Ronald Inglehart (1997) has consistently shown that those societies that attach the
most value to materialist objectives, which concern material needs such as security, shelter
and sustenance, are poorer than societies that care relatively less about material goals and
favor postmaterialist objectives such as autonomy and self-expression instead.
The latter, of course, is not usually regarded a paradox. On the contrary, Inglehart (1997)
has a perfectly plausible explanation for the value change he observes when societies grow
richer. The richer a society becomes, the less importance people attach to growing richer
still. Wealth, like most other objectives, faces diminishing marginal utility (see also Ingle-
hart 1987, 1990). To show how this principle works, Fig. 1 illustrates a choice between
materialist and postmaterialist objectives.
In this figure, the solid line depicts utility experienced by society as a result of satiating
materialist objectives. The dotted line depicts utility derived from satiation of postmaterial-
ist goals. The fact that the solid line lies above the dotted line indicates that society overall
attaches more value to materialist than to postmaterialist goals. When faced with the choice
of what to stress, society will therefore initially express a strong bias towards materialist
objectives. Satiating material objectives renders more utility than satiating postmaterialist
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objectives. However, the declining slope of the function implies that the more materialist
objectives become satiated, the less additional utility any more satiation delivers. The utility
gained by extra materialist satiation relative to extra postmaterialist satiation thus falls. At
some point, more material wealth becomes less attractive than satiating postmaterialist ob-
jectives. Society reaches this point when the slope of the solid line equals the slope of the
dotted line in the origin; from there on, it will start favoring postmaterialism.
It is important to note that this eventual preference for postmaterialism in general is inde-
pendent of the fact that, overall, society values materialism more. Society would still choose
materialism over postmaterialism any time when satiation levels were equal. In other words,
the attitude towards materialism has not changed; it is only the attitude towards more ma-
terialism on top of the current endowment that has changed. This distinction is important,
because only the first corresponds to what the literature identifies as cultural values or atti-
tudes (e.g., Hofstede 1980; House et al. 2004; Inglehart 1990, 1997), and only the first can
function as an autonomous factor in determining behavior and outcomes. The latter, which
we may dub the marginal preference for materialism, is determined by outcomes rather than
determining them.
From a comparative point of view, the interpretation of survey scores as marginal pref-
erences implies that societies, which emphasize postmaterialist objectives the most, are pre-
cisely those that have the highest satiation of materialist relative to postmaterialist objec-
tives. This negative relation may seem paradoxical if one expects attitudes to be explanatory
variables determining outcomes. However, if one views attitudes measured in surveys as re-
sponses to outcomes rather than as causes of them, a negative relation is exactly what one
would expect.
3.2 The diminishing marginal utility of democracy
Can the principle of diminishing marginal utility, which Inglehart (1990) argues is the
driving force behind the famous value shift in industrial societies, explain the other para-
doxes in the study of proclaimed values and outcomes? The answer seems to be yes. The
finding that those with a strong work ethic do not tend to generate much income (Bertrand
and Mullainathan 2001; Weil 2009), suddenly makes sense if one interprets the survey score
as marginal preference. Those who are working long hours earning a high income or in
high-income jobs are likely to favor some leisure above more work, whereas those who
are in low-income or part-time jobs are likely to have enough of leisure, preferring some
work now. Similarly, the fact that respondents in Muslim-majority countries tend to favor
democracy more, while having less of it, is also understandable. If their survey scores de-
pict marginal preferences rather than an underlying cultural attitude, Muslims’ sympathy for
democracy simply reflects their relative deprivation of it; other people would be similarly
enthusiastic about democracy were they to live in the kind of repressive environments that
characterize many Islamic countries.
From this perspective the paradox observed in studies like that of Rowley and Smith
(2009) needs no explanation. It simply does not exist. Countries with relatively low levels
of democracy are likely to favor democracy more strongly because people value that which
is scarce. To see a paradox in this is a consequence of a misinterpretation of WVS items as
eliciting cultural attitudes where in actuality they capture marginal preferences.3
3It should be noted that even if the WVS items in question elicit marginal preferences, this by no means auto-
matically holds for all WVS items. Indeed, many WVS items tap beliefs and perceptions of actual situations
rather than attitudes and preferences. These are not sensitive to the marginal preferences problem; a person’s
belief in God is likely to increase only when the actual presence of God in his life increases.
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3.3 Hypotheses
It is possible to test whether the marginal-preferences problem plaguing attitudinal data ac-
counts for the paradoxical relation between Islam and democracy by looking at the relation
between the WVS items measuring democratic attitudes and democratic institutions in gen-
eral. If the WVS items elicit cultural attitudes, as they have been designed to do, we expect a
positive relation between sympathy for democracy and democratic institutions. In that case,
the paradox remains; the question is why Muslim-majority countries’ institutions do not
evolve in line with their populations’ preferences.
If, on the other hand, the WVS items elicit marginal preferences, we expect a negative
correlation between the level of democracy and democratic attitudes as measured by the
WVS items. The finding that Muslim-majority countries combine a relatively strong pref-
erence for democracy with little actual democracy is in that case just part of the general
negative relation between marginal preferences and circumstances; the more one has of
something, the less one desires increments to it.
At the same time, prosperity and education likely foster a more favorable outlook on
democracy. This holds independent of the question whether survey measures elicit cultural
attitudes or marginal preferences, although the mechanism differs between the two con-
structs. In the case of cultural attitudes, we expect the effect of gross domestic product (GDP)
and education to run primarily through factors such as literacy and the size of a critical mid-
dle class, changing the mindset of people. In the case of marginal preferences, we also expect
an effect of GDP and education, but here the mechanism is that satiation of these rival objec-
tives makes democracy more important to people by default—rather like satiating material-
ist objectives makes people more postmaterialist (Inglehart 1987, 1990, 1997). In line with
Robert Barro’s view of democracy as a sort of luxury good (Barro 1996: 24), the relative
deprivation of democracy is larger in societies where other pressing needs have been met.
Regardless of the mechanism involved, we therefore expect a positive effect of income
and education on attitudes towards democracy. Any relation between democratic attitudes
and levels of democracy should subsequently be seen as conditional on education and indi-
vidual and country per-capita income. We have the following two competing hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1a: If the WVS items used to measure democratic attitudes elicit cultural
attitudes, we expect a positive relation between attitudes measured by these items and
actual levels of democracy, other factors controlled for.
Hypothesis 1b: If the WVS items used to measure democratic attitudes elicit marginal
preferences, we expect a negative relation between attitudes measured by these items
and actual levels of democracy, other factors controlled for.
We test these hypotheses in the next section where we combine individual-level data
on professed attitudes towards democracy with data on existing levels of democracy in the
respondents’ countries, and include variables concerning individuals’ socio-demographic
characteristics and other features of their societies as controls, particularly individuals’ level
of education and GDP per capita.
4 Empirical analysis
4.1 Data
Data on our dependent variables come from the World Values Survey or WVS (European
Values Study Group & World Values Survey Association 2006). The WVS has grown out
Public Choice (2011) 147: 481–496 489
of the European Values Survey (EVS), which in the period 1981–1984 surveyed respon-
dents from a number of European countries. Since then, it has evolved into a global project
covering 84 societies, spanning some 80% of world population. Individual responses for all
waves (1: 1981–1984, 2: 1989–1993, 3: 1994–1999, and 4: 1999–2004), almost 270,000
individuals in total, are now contained in a publicly available dataset. For our research, it is
especially important to note that in the design and conduct of the WVS, care is taken to min-
imize the risk of potential distortions caused by repressive environments (see our discussion
on preference falsification in section two). Survey questions are largely identical between
countries—no compromises were made in politically repressive regimes—and interviewers
are instructed to stress the confidentiality of respondents’ answers. Interviews are conducted
in isolation. In strongly male-dominated societies, women are interviewed by female in-
terviewers. The websites of the WVS and the EVS, http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org and
http://www.europeanvalues.nl, give further information concerning the items included in the
survey and the way country surveys are conducted.
The WVS dataset contains several items concerning individuals’ attitudes towards
democracy. Following Rowley and Smith (2009) we identify five of these (cf. Table 1).
The first item, Item 1, asks individuals how they feel about different systems for governing
their country, including democracy: I’m going to describe various types of political systems
and ask what you think about each as a way of governing this country. For each one, would
you say it is a very good (4), fairly good (3), fairly bad (2) or very bad (1) way of governing
this country? The other four items asks respondents what they think about certain features
of democracy as a political system: I’m going to read off some things that people sometimes
say about a democratic political system. Could you please tell me if you agree strongly (1),
agree (2), disagree (3) or disagree strongly (4), after I read each one of them? The specific
items read as follows: In democracy, the economic system runs badly (Item 2); Democracies
are indecisive and have too much quibbling (Item 3); Democracies aren’t good at main-
taining order (Item 4); and Democracy may have problems but it’s better than any other
form of government (Item 5). We recode answers to these variables—specifically for the last
item—so that a score of 1 corresponds to the least democratic response and 4 to the most
democratic response with 2 and 3 in between (again see Table 1).
Next to data on democratic attitudes, we further rely on the WVS dataset for individual-
level control variables. Our aim is to investigate whether a country’s level of democ-
racy has a negative effect on the value its citizens attach to democracy, and we do so
with potential individual determinants of democratic attitude controlled for. These are Em-
ployment status (Full-time, Part-time, Self-employed, Retired, Housewife, Student, Unem-
ployed, or Other), Income scale (1–10), Education (Inadequately completed elementary edu-
cation, Completed (compulsory) elementary education, Incomplete secondary school: tech-
nical/vocational type, Complete secondary school: technical/vocational type, Incomplete
secondary: university-preparatory type, Complete secondary: university-preparatory type,
Some university without degree, or University with degree), Sex, and Age. Table 2 gives
descriptive statistics for our five democracy items and selected individual-level variables.
We supplement the WVS data on attitudes towards democracy and socio-demographics
with country (and year) data on democracy and per-capita GDP. The source of the democ-
racy data is the Polity IV Project. This project measures the democratic quality of gov-
erning institutions for 163 countries over the period 1800–2008. We use its revised polity
measure (the so-called polity 2 measure) of democracy, which has been specifically de-
veloped for use in time-series analysis. We match the polity measure of democracy and
our individual measures of democratic attitudes both to countries and years of the WVS
data. Scores on the polity measure of democracy from the Polity IV Project range from
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Table 2 Descriptive statistics for selected variables
Variable Mean Individual observations Standard deviation
Dependents
Item 1 3.34 155,879 0.733
Item 2 2.73 141,203 0.803
Item 3 2.48 143,891 0.833
Item 4 2.72 144,305 0.820
Item 5 3.24 146,381 0.743
Independents
Level 1
Age 40.8 166,849 16.0
Sex (Male = 1) 48.9% 167,072 50.0%
Incomplete elementary education 10.4% 167,172 30.5%
University degree 13.9% 167,172 34.6%
Level 2
Polity IV 5.66 152,364 5.50
GDP [1990$] 8,541 165,058 7,054
Notes: Respondents with “don’t know” or otherwise missing answers have been dropped. Data on selected
independent variables covers only individuals and country observations for which scores on the dependents,
Item 1–5, are available
−10 (lowest score possible) to +10 (highest score possible). The Polity IV website,
http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm, gives a detailed description of the polity
measure of democracy and access to a downloadable data file.
Our GDP data comes from The Conference Board & Groningen Growth and De-
velopment Centre (2008) and we again make an exact match between countries and
years available from this dataset and our WVS data. Levels of GDP per capita range
from about $600 to almost $34,000 (1990 PPPs). The website of the Conference Board,
http://www.conference-board.org/economics/database.cfm, has further information and an
Excel file available for download. The bottom two rows of Table 2 give descriptive statistics
for these two country-level variables.
4.2 Methodology
Our values data concern the attitudes towards democracy expressed by individuals living
in certain countries and faced with a certain political environment. The nature of the data,
and our theoretical argument predicting that contextual factors shape individuals’ scores on
questionnaire items aiming to elicit attitudes, call for a multilevel approach to testing our
hypotheses. This way we avoid simply throwing together predictors at the individual and
the contextual level, and treating them the same. In our case, we have individuals (level
one) who are nested in countries (level two), and applying multilevel or hierarchical linear
modeling (e.g., Gelman and Hill 2007) we are able to separate the individual and aggregate
correlates of democratic attitudes and estimate them simultaneously. In addition, the mul-
tilevel technique allows for more efficient inference than is possible with either complete
pooling or no pooling of the data.
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Given the nature of the data, with individuals nested in countries, it is further likely that
clustering of observations causes a problem for traditional regression techniques. Individuals
within countries are not independent observations so standard errors may be underestimated
(e.g., Moulton 1990). Multilevel modeling takes such clustering into account.
For the formal empirical model we start with an individual i (level one) living in country
j (level two). DAij subsequently denotes the individual’s attitude towards democracy (any
of the five items). The dependent variable of interest is the level of democracy in a country
measured by its score on the polity measure of democracy, PDj . We also include xij , a set
of individual-level control variables, and GDPj , a country’s level of per-capita GDP as a
country-level control variable. This gives the following empirical models for levels one and
two, separately and combined:
Level 1: DAij = β0j + β1xij + εij
Level 2: β0j = γ00 + γ01PDj + γ02GDPj + u0j






The complete general model is a varying-intercepts (country fixed effects) model. We
thus take into account any country-specific factors that may affect individuals’ attitude to-
wards democracy but are not controlled for by the aggregate-level variables that we include.
The terms in parentheses constitute the random part of the model and the other terms the
fixed part. The error terms in the random part capture the difference between a multilevel
model and a traditional model: there is a “normal” residual error term (εij )—familiar from
classic regression analysis—but also an aggregate-level error term (u0j ). The model is esti-
mated using maximum likelihood procedures.
4.3 Results
Table 3 depicts results for our baseline model with only individual-level (control) variables
included. We estimated five empirical models (A1–A5) and included all of the individual
variables. Hence, the models differ with respect to their dependent variable, i.e., the specific
survey item used to measure democratic attitude. In line with the existing literature and
our predictions, both personal income and education contribute to a more positive attitude
towards democracy. In addition, we find that being employed generally has a positive effect,
and that men tend to have stronger democratic attitudes than women do.
To test our hypotheses, we estimate the same five models, further including GDP per
capita and the actual level of democracy as determinants of democratic attitudes (Models
B1–B5). As Table 4 shows, there is a clear negative relation between the level of democracy
and the attitude towards democracy for four out of five measures. For the other measure, Item
1, we find no statistically significant relation between attitudes and levels of democracy.
In line with our predictions, GDP per capita has a positive effect. Likelihood ratio tests
further show that all B models provide a statistically significantly better fit than the A models
(p < 0.05 or better).
These findings lead us to accept Hypothesis 1b (and reject Hypothesis 1a). Democratic
attitudes do not seem to determine actual levels of democracy. Rather, they are a reaction to
the level of democracy; if there is enough, people value it less. We note, however, that the
results depicted in Table 4 may suffer from a multicollinearity problem as GDP per capita
and level of democracy are likely correlated. Hence, to check the robustness of our findings
we have also estimated the effect of the actual level of democracy on professed attitude
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Table 3 Baseline model with individual determinants of democratic attitude
Variables Model A1 Model A2 Model A3 Model A4 Model A5
Intercept 3.10∗∗∗ 2.52∗∗∗ 2.31∗∗∗ 2.54∗∗∗ 2.97∗∗∗
(0.033) (0.034) (0.037) (0.035) (0.036)
Part-time −0.012 −0.024∗∗ −0.002 −0.001 0.002
(0.008) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009)
Self-employed 0.008 0.004 −(0.008 −0.008 0.013
(0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008)
Retired −0.024∗∗∗ −0.052∗∗∗ −0.067∗∗∗ −0.045∗∗∗ −0.027∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009)
Housewife 0.002 0.001 0.015 −0.006 0.006
(0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008)
Student 0.049∗∗∗ 0.018 0.029∗∗ 0.025∗∗ 0.021∗∗
(0.009) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010)
Unemployed −0.026∗∗∗ −0.057∗∗∗ −0.042∗∗∗ −0.037∗∗∗ −0.007
(0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008)
Other employment status −0.014 −0.016 −0.013 0.005 −0.003
(0.015) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.015)
Income scale (1–10) 0.010∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Inadequately completed −0.003 −0.007 0.035∗∗∗ 0.015 0.003
elementary education (0.009) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.009)
Incomplete secondary: −0.005 −0.023∗∗ −0.019∗ −0.001 0.005
technical/vocational (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009)
Complete secondary: 0.070∗∗∗ 0.053∗∗∗ 0.034∗∗∗ 0.063∗∗∗ 0.054∗∗∗
technical/vocational (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008)
Incomplete secondary: 0.068∗∗∗ 0.085∗∗∗ 0.064∗∗∗ 0.090∗∗∗ 0.083∗∗∗
university-preparatory (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009)
Complete secondary: 0.125∗∗∗ 0.103∗∗∗ 0.095∗∗∗ 0.121∗∗∗ 0.105∗∗∗
university-preparatory (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008)
Some university without degree 0.188∗∗∗ 0.188∗∗∗ 0.153∗∗∗ 0.208∗∗∗ 0.176∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010)
University with degree 0.233∗∗∗ 0.244∗∗∗ 0.219∗∗∗ 0.250∗∗∗ 0.206∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009)
Sex (Male = 1) 0.048∗∗∗ 0.060∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗ 0.033∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Age [/100] 0.251∗∗∗ 0.018 0.150 0.123 0.378∗∗∗
(0.079) (0.091) (0.093) (0.093) (0.083)
Age2[/10,000] −0.048 0.024 −0.207∗∗ −0.240∗∗ −0.122
(0.089) (0.102) (0.104) (0.104) (0.093)
Countries 69 68 68 68 68
Level-2 observations 101 98 98 98 98
Individual observations 117,565 106,031 107,824 107,240 109,335
−2Loglikelihood 247,442.9 242,503.9 254,248.1 249,992.7 234,004.7
Notes: See Table 2. Standard errors in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ denotes significance at the 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01
level respectively. Base category is a full-time employed woman with completed (compulsory) elementary
education. All models have varying intercepts
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Table 4 Multilevel results of the relation between level of democracy and democratic attitude
Variables Model B1 Model B2 Model B3 Model B4 Model B5
Intercept 3.03∗∗∗ 2.44∗∗∗ 2.20∗∗∗ 2.42∗∗∗ 3.16∗∗∗
(0.043) (0.041) (0.050) (0.043) (0.065)
Polity −0.001 −0.022∗∗∗ −0.022∗∗∗ −0.013∗∗∗ −0.059∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
GDP 0.078∗∗∗ 0.217∗∗∗ 0.249∗∗∗ 0.205∗∗∗ 0.146∗∗∗
(0.029) (0.029) (0.035) (0.030) (0.039)
Individual controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
−2Loglikelihood 247,435.8 242,352.7 254,112.2 249,925.1 233,032.9
Notes: See Table 3. Individual controls are Employment status, Income scale (1–10), Sex, Education (dum-
mies), Age and Age2
Table 5 Robustness: Effect of democracy without GDP
Variables Model C1 Model C2 Model C3 Model C4 Model C5
Intercept 3.10∗∗∗ 2.62∗∗∗ 2.41∗∗∗ 2.59∗∗∗ 3.29∗∗∗
(0.034) (0.037) (0.038) (0.038) (0.061)
Polity −0.000 −0.019∗∗∗ −0.018∗∗∗ −0.009∗∗∗ −0.059∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Individual controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
−2Loglikelihood 247,442.9 242,404.6 254,163.1 249,968.8 233,044.9
Notes: See Table 4
towards democracy without controlling for levels of per-capita income (Models C1–C5).
This is not our preferred model for theoretical reasons outlined above. Nevertheless, Table 5
shows our results to be robust: also with GDP excluded the actual level of democracy has a
negative effect on attitudes towards democracy.4
Turning to implications for the Muslim democracy paradox, we find that no such para-
dox exists. Firstly, the paradox holds much more broadly: countries that have lower lev-
els of democracy are consistently more democratically inclined—this negative correla-
tion is not limited to Muslim countries. Secondly, measurement issues likely account for
this observed negative correlation between attitudes towards democracy and actual demo-
cratic practice: such a negative attitude-practice correlation may result from the marginal-
preferences problem—in which respondents are led by their current circumstances when
asked how they feel about a certain state of affairs—known to affect attitudinal measures.
4As we would expect, Models C1–C5 provide better fits than Models A1–A5, but poorer fits than Models B1–
B5, as evidenced by their −2Loglikelihood score. Likelihood ratio tests show the difference to be statistically
significant (p < 0.01). Model B1 is the exception.
494 Public Choice (2011) 147: 481–496
5 Conclusion and discussion
This paper has argued that there is no evidence of an Islamic democracy paradox. We show
that the findings that Muslim countries are less democratic, whereas their inhabitants value
democracy more, are not exceptional. A negative relation between democratic attitudes and
democratic levels is a general phenomenon, not specific to Muslim countries. Neither is such
a negative relation paradoxical. A relative lack of democracy makes people want more of
it. This is the principle of diminishing marginal utility. That principle applies to marginal
preferences, however, and not to people’s underlying attitudes. It is only the preference
for more democracy that increases when democratic institutions fade; the attitude towards
democracy in general is not affected.
By arguing that marginal preferences lie behind the observed Islamic democracy para-
dox, we do not mean to claim that this is necessarily the only answer. As pointed out,
survey instruments should be treated with caution when used in politically repressive con-
texts. What is more, survey instruments are prone to cultural differences in understand-
ing of the concepts they deal with. The measures of democratic attitudes derived from the
WVS deal only with how much people like democracy, while not everyone may understand
the same thing by democracy. Based on the literature, one may hypothesize that Muslims
tend towards different interpretations of democracy than others (Inglehart and Norris 2003;
Mogahed 2006). Further research in this direction is needed.
The finding of an Islamic democracy paradox is another indication of the marginal pref-
erence problem in values surveys: questionnaire items on attitudes and related entities tend
to elicit marginal preferences (the importance attached to an objective on top of its current
level) rather much more so than durable attitudinal traits (the importance attached to an
objective in general). Instead of taking attitudinal survey scores as exogenous inputs deter-
mining political-economic outcomes, these results show that interpreting them as rational
reactions to different circumstances is more illuminative. Simply ascribing differences in
professed attitudes or behavior to religion or cultural background does nothing to help us
understand the rationality behind them. That is not to say that religious and cultural values
do not matter. However, if we want to investigate cross-cultural differences in attitudes to-
wards democracy or any other objective, this requires moving beyond values survey items
towards other, more valid and more reliable measures.
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